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In t h i s  paper I propose to  examine c r i t i c a l l y  some fundamental 
things. I hope not to make plat i tudinous remarks. There w i l l  be 
quotat ions but  only f r o m  persons of t h e  highest  attainment. 
If w e  are to discuss  mathematics we must first decide i n  as 
exact a way as w e  can what it is t h a t  w e  are t o  discuss. 
ago Courant and Robbins published a book of some four  hundred pages 
e n t i t l e d  'What is Mathematics. If 
t h e  assumption t h a t  i t  takes a t  least fou r  hundred pages t o  show, not 
to tell,  what mathematics does and how. I be l i eve  t h a t  some 
mathematicians would contend tha t  it takes a t  l e a s t  three years of 
graduate study. However, w e  bear i n  m i n d  t h a t  t h e  professional  
mathematician may be "unable to see t h e  forest f o r  t h e  trees." It is 
good for him to  study some philosophy and to s tand  and contemplate 
h i s  subjec t  as a whole and t o  c r i t i c a l l y  examine t h e  value t o  mankind 
of what he is doing. 
A f e w  years 
The book w a s  apparently wr i t t en  -der 
If w e  view what actual ly  is done by those who c a l l  thenselves 
mathematicians and those who c a l l  themselves phys ic i s t s  o r  astronomers 
or f o r  t h a t  matter almost any type of s c i e n t i s t  w e  a r e  impressed by 
much overlapping and a confused and ill-marked boundary. Once a t  a 
meeting of t h e  Society f o r  Engineering Education t h e r e  w a s  a j o i n t  
meeting of t h e  section on mechanics and t h e  sec t ion  on mathematics. 
I rose to  t h e  occasion, saying t h a t ,  as mechanics r e a l l y  was 
mathematics I thought t h e  jo in t  meeting splendid and t h a t  such 
meetings should be held f requent ly .  
reasons, s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o  me, as to  why mechanics was mathematics. 
Whereupon, one of t h e  members present,  a dist inguished e l e c t r i c a l  
engineer, a rose  and s a i d  t h a t  he  agreed w i t h  everything t h a t  I had 
I 
On being pushed, I gave a fev 
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s a i d  but that t h e  arguments which I had advanced c l a s s i f i e d  the whole 
sc ience  of e l e c t r i c i t y  a s  mathematics q u i t e  a s  much a s  it d id  
mechanics. Then there is geometry. What subjec t  is more universa l ly  
classified as mathematics than geometry. Although strict formalists 
may loudly protest, geometry may be regarded as t h e  study of the  space 
of experience. In  passing I quote t h e  l a t e  Maxhe Bo"cher (l), 
professor of mathematics a t  Harvard and one of America's most 
dis t inguished mathematicians : 
Thus, geometry becomes t h e  simplest of the  
na tu ra l  sciences and its axioms a r e  of t h e  na ture  
of physical laws, to  be tested by experience, 
It is hard f o r  m e  t o  be l ieve  tha t  Scher, w h o  was a man of 
profound scholarship,  had only elementary geometry i n  mind. I s h a l l  
have more to  say  on t h i s  topic l a t e r .  
Many non-mathematicians attempt to sepa ra t e  their subjec t  f r o m  
mathematics by a h .  Mechanics is taught both by physicists and 
mathematicians. 
t h e  basis of aim contend loudly t h a t  mechanics is physics. 
Phys ic i s t s  usual ly  make a grea t  point  of a b  and on 
Some 
even refer to  what they c a l l  "pure mathematics" a s  a "game." T h i s  
seems an attempt to disclaim tha t  mathematics w i t h  which they them= 
s e l v e s  a r e  not famil iar ,  Again I become lost i n  confusion; Fourier 
wished to  study the f l o w  of heat (physics) but  he developed t h e  theory 
of t r igonometr ic  series ("pure" mathematics). 
Le t  us proceed and let us r e a l i z e  t h a t  w e  a r e  not remaking 
t h e  language and t h a t  any meaning w h i c h  w e  g ive  to  a t e r m  must not 
depart too f a r  from common usage. As a matter of f a c t ,  a t  t h i s  
junc ture  instead of laying down a d e f i n i t i o n  of mathematics I s h a l l  
quote  some de f in i t i ons  t h a t  have been given and examine them b r i e f ly  
but  cr it ic a 1 l y  . 
C 
I have heard it s a i d  t h a t  Charles Darwin gave t h e  following 
(He probably never did) s 
A mathematician is a b l ind  man i n  a dark 
r o o m  looking for a black h a t  t h a t  i s n ' t  there. 
W e  may a l s o  g ive  t h e  frequent ly  made remark: "Mathematics is 
what mathematicians do. f f  
In a recent  i s s u e  of t h e  magazine Science, Bernard Friedman ( 2 )  
says: What a r e  mathemat ic ians  doing? They a r e  t ry ing  t o  make 
precise t h e  i n t u i t i o n  of poets. f f  
The first t w o  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  of course jocular.  The o ther  t w o  
only p a r t l y  so. 
the context i n  which they appear. 
To be properly appreciated they  must be pondered i n  
It is hoped t h a t  they  w i l l  be 
appreciated by those w h o  read t h i s  paper to  t h e  end. 
N o t  long ago I was chat t ing with a f r i e n d  when I was a b i t  
s t a r t l e d  by h i s  t e l l i n g  m e , i n  order to put m e  i n  m y  p l a c e , i n  an 
argument t h a t  mathematics was the  science of measurement and t h a t  
alone. I a l s o  recent ly  encountered t h i s  - Wathematics is t h e  science 
of quant i ty  or magnitude," 
o r ig ina t ed  but l i k e  Shakespeare's Cleopatra, "Age  cannot wither her 
Heaven knows where t h i s  type of d e f i h i t i o n  
nor custom stale her i n f i n i t e  variety." 
Turning t o  what is to  us a more ser ious  approach: The f irst  
American mathematician of in te rna t iona l  reputa t ion  was Benjamin Peirce 
of Harvard, popularly known as the Astronomer, i n  t h a t  charming book 
The Autocrat of the  Breakfast Table. In  1870 Peirce (3) w r o t e r  
Mathematics is t h e  science which draws 
necessary conclusions . 
I c a l l  t h i s  a grea t  de f in i t i on  i n  as much as for now near ly  a 
hundred years it has been the s t a r t i n g  p i n t  for many discussions on 
L 
t h e  nature  of mathematics. I t  is t o  be noticed tha t  its emphasis is 
on method rather than on subject  matter or aim. The word "necessary" 
is not su f f i c i en t ly  precise, that  is w e  are not told what methods of 
drawing conclusions are allowable. Finally,  many of us  regard t h e  
whole de f in i t i on  as too broad, 
Whitehead (4) says: 
Mathematics i n  its widest s ign i f icance  is the  
development of a l l  types of formal necessary deductive 
reasoning. 
This is an attempt t o  be more precise than Peirce. The words 
a l l  types a r e  satisfying. 
bu t  i ts  s p e c i f i c  mention is again sa t i s fy ing .  
a wishful thinking t o  include a s  a p a r t  of mathematics t h e  i n t u i t i o n  or 
Deductive was probably intended by Peirce -
Y e t ,  there is w i t h  some 
induction which precedes formal proof. There is a l s o  again t h e  possible 
criticism t h a t  the def in i t i on  is too broad and w i l l  include more than is 
commonly understood as mathematics. 
Numerous w r i t e r s  have compared mathematics and logic. Morris R. 
a h e n  ( 5 )  a t  one time professor of philosophy a t  t h e  University of 
Chicago says: %athematics as a purely formal subjec t  is indeed i d e n t i c a l  
w i t h  logic.tt W e  add nothing to Nature by c a l l i n g  it God. 
Percy Bxidgman, Nobel Laureate i n  physics, ( 6 )  says: Wathematics 
which is usual ly  recognized t o  be properly a branch of logic.t' 
Thus, according to  Bridgman, mathematics is a branch of logic 
and not coextensive w i t h  l og ic  as s t a t e d  by Cohen. 
been a tremendous development of what was ca l l ed  symbolic logic  and 
However, t h e r e  has 
mostly by men t ra ined  i n  mathematics and who consider themselves 
mathematicians. There is now a tendency to  d iscard  t h e  t e r m  f'symbolictl 
under t he  assumption t h a t  (continued on page 5 . )  
. C  . '. 
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t h e r e  is no o the r  type of logic, With t h i s  point  of view l o g i c  
becomes a part of mathematics, not  mathematics a p a r t  of logic ,  
Bearing i n  some way on t h i s  point, almst a l l  present-day s tudents  of 
mathematics s tudy some logic ,  Why? For a better understanding of 
their subjec t ,  to  aid i n  i ts  study, for general  education or because 
it is a part of t h e i r  subject?  
The de f in i t i ons ,  which I have quoted put t h e  emphasis on method. 
I next quote t h e  now c l a s s i c a l  d e f i n i t i o n  of B e r t r a n d  Russell ( 7 ) :  
Pure mathematics is  the  c l a s s  of a l l  
proposi t ions of the  f o r m  -- p i m l i e s  q - where p 
and q a r e  proposit ions containing one or more 
va r i ab le s  the same i n  t h e  t w o  proposit ions and 
ne i the r  p nor  q contains any constants except 
l o g i c a l  constants, And log ica l  constants a r e  
a l l  notions defined i n  terms of t h e  following: 
implication, t h e  r e l a t i o n  of a t e r m  to  a c l a s s  
of which it is a member, the notion of such tha t ,  
t h e  notion of r e l a t i o n  and such f u r t h e r  notions 
a s  may be involved i n  t h e  general ao t ion  of 
proposi t ions of t h e  above f o r m ,  In  addi t ion  to 
these, mathematics uses a notion =hi& is not a 
cons t i tuent  of t h e  proposit ions which it considers, 
namely the  notion of t ru th ,  
I wish I knew what Russell meant by "truthtt  Whitehead and 
Pe i rce  say mathematics implies, A t  t he  t i m e  t h a t  h e  w r o t e  t h i s  Russell  
must have been something of a fundamentalist,  It was early i n  h i s  
career. Russell seems t o  have regarded mathematics a s  a body of 
proposi t ions (theorems), not as a process but a s  the r e s u l t s  of that 
process. As a d e f i n i t i o n  t h e  word i m p l i e s  may be construed induct ively 
although t h i s  would be contrary to Russel l ' s  mathematical procedure, 
A t  a l a t e r  time ( 8 )  h e  remarks: 
W e  s h a l l  assume t h a t  a l l  mathematics is 
deductive. 
In  Russe l l ' s  jocular de f in i t i on  quoted a t  t h e  beginning of t h i s  paper 
t h e  w o r d  #'truett occurs again. 
I s t a r t e d  t h i s  discussion with s o m e  remarks on def ining 
mathematics by means of its subject  matter. I now re turn  t o  t h i s  and 
g i v e  a very in t e re s t ing  def ini t ion.  It comes from Study, formerly 
professor of mathematics a t  Bonn, and genera l ly  recognized a s  one of 
the leading geometers of t h i s  century. Study (9) says: 
Mathematics includes computation with 
na tura l  numbers and everything tha t  can be 
founded upon it, but nothing else. 
This f s  a subjec t  matter def in i t ion .  A t  first glance it seem 
much too narrow. However, t h e  more I ponder it the less s u r e  f a m  
of t h i s .  In  support of Study, w e  have many people. Minkowski was 
professor of mathematics a t  Gottingen. H i s  work seems t o  have 
in sp i r ed  a good deal of Einstein 's  e a r l y  work on r e l a t i v i t y .  H e  was 
c e r t a i n l y  one of t he  grea t  minds of t h e  e a r l y  twent ie th  century. 
Minkowski (10) says: t f Integral  numbers a r e  t h e  fountainhead of a l l  
m a  thema tics . (*
The following is f r o m  A. Corn& (12) : "There is no inquiry which is  
not  f i n a l l y  reducible  t o  a question of  numbers." 
Kronecker (13) says: "The whole numbers a r e  f r o m  t h e  Dear God 
a l l  else is made by man." 
A colleague of mine recent ly  remarked when t a lk ing  informally, 
t h a t  mathematics is l a rge ly  a s tudy of ordered pairs .  
We now pass t o  a point of view t h a t  is d i f fe ren t .  David 
H i l b e r t ,  one of the leading mathematicians of t h e  early twent ie th  
century and a r e a l  founder of t h e  present school of mathematical l o g i c  
held t h a t  - Mathematics is e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  manipulation of s y m b o l s e  = 
I do not  remember seeing a concise d e f i n i t i o n  but  t h i s  idea pervades 
a l l  of h is  wr i t ings  on t h e  nature  of mathematics: 
I now give  Poincarets (14) o f t  quoted remark: 
Mathematicians do not s tudy  ob jec t s  bu t  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s  between objects, Matter does not engage 
their a t ten t ion ,  They a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  form alone. 
H e r e  I again call  t o  mind Russel l ' s  jocular  remark quoted 
a t  t he  beginning af t h i s  paper. 
Mathematics is t h a t  sub jec t  in which one never 
knows what he is ta lk ing  about or if what he says is t rue ,  
The most d e t a i l e d  and clearest de f in i t i on  along t h i s  l i n e  t h a t  
I have seen w a s  given by C ,  I, Lewis (15) a t  t h a t  t i m e  professor a t  
Harva rd, 
A mathematical system is any set o f  s t r i n g s  
of  recognizable marks i n  which some of t h e  strings a r e  
taken i n i t i a l l y  and t h e  remainder derived f r o m  these by 
operat ions performed according to  r u l e s  which a r e  
independent of any meaning assigned to the  marks. 
I sha l l  t a k e  t h e  liberty of elaborat ing Lewis  a l i t t le.  As 
commonly held by mathematicians: A mathematical s t r u c t u r e  consists of 
c e r t a i n  undefined t e r m s  (symbols), c e r t a i n  axioms t h a t  is r e l a t i o n s  
between them, an agreed logic, t h a t  is method of drawing conclusions, 
and strings of theorems derived by means of t h e  logic, New terms or 
symbols may be introduced a t  any t i m e  for convenience provided of 
course, nothing ou t s ide  t h e  sys tem w i t h  which w e  began is introduced. 
T h i s  s t r u c t u r e  is b u i l t  ra ther  than discovered, 
Much has been wr i t ten  about the axioms of the  system. The 
quest ion of language i n  t h e  broad sense  is not usual ly  discussed. 
It seems t o  m e  t h a t  formalists i n  mathematics a r e  s a t i s f i e d  
w i t h  Lewis, and c e r t a i n l y  t h e  majority of mathematicians a t  the  
present t i m e  should be called formalists - f o l l o w  t h e  s t r i n g s  wher-  
ever they lead. 
The terms formal i s t  and i n t u i t i o n i s t  a r e  not  precise. However, 
there is a usage. I th ink  t o  understand these  terms w e  must consider 
axioms and d e f i n i t i o n s  f o r  such d i f f e rence  as there is seems to  m e  t o  
stem from these two things. 
About the tu rn  of t he  century there was an awakening among 
physicists for more rigor i n  t h e i r  field. 
other things a demand for operational d e f i n i t i o n s  - Physicists def ine 
things the  way they do them - unless the operat ional  d e f i n i t i o n  is 
clear, an appreciat ion o f  the  Eins te in  theory of r e l a t i v i t y  is wholly 
impassible, In  the c l a s s i c a l  treatment of mechanics tftimeft is an 
undefined t e r m .  However, i n  the  r e l a t i v i t y  theory t i m e  is defined by 
the  way it is measured. Those of us who a r e  old enough may r e c a l l  
snears  made by some a t  t h e  statement: = Time is defined by a clock. 9 
If t h i s  is understood w e  can understand Eddington (16) when he says 
t h a t  physics cons i s t s  of po in te r  rsadings. 
This brought a b u t  among 
What is said appl ies  to a l l  sciences i f  properly s tud ied  or so 
it seems to  me. Their  primary purpose is to describe secondari ly  to 
forecast. I do not c a l l  mathematics a sc ience  prefer r ing  a separate 
c l a s s i f i ca t ion .  Of aourse, if I were addressing the  National Science 
Foundation? I might feel different ly .  
I now digress b r i e f l y  t o  discuss isomorphism. Two mathematical 
s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  isomorphic if they a r e  mathematically i d e n t i c a l  the 
d i f f e rence  between them being one of language only. 
common dualism of p ro jec t ive  geometry i n  which, for example, the  system 
of l i n e s  and poin ts  i n  a plane is isomorphic to t h e  system of poin ts  
and l i n e s  i n  a way fami l ia r  to every s tudent  of geometry a generation 
ago. 
An example is the  
The mathematical s t ruc tu res  are i d e n t i c a l  hence t o  a fo rma l i s t  
. 
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t h e  term isomorphic is meaningless, W e  have but  one mathematical 
s t ruc ture .  
Now to  physics - I s h a l l  not d iscard  t h e  term isomorphic. 
If a set of objec ts  of physical or other s igni f icance ,  not  t h e  ba re  
bones of mathematics can be put i n t o  one t o  one correspondence with 
the undefined term crk a mathematical structure and if laws can be 
stated about them corresponding axiom to  law, law to  axiom w i t h  t h e  
mathematical system, w e  may say t h a t  the two systems 8re isomorphic 
and appl ica t ions  of mathematics s t e p  i n t o  t h e  picture.  Theorems say: 
"If you do t h i s  you w i l l  get that." 
I n o w  ask the  question: Is it r e a l l y  possible to  have iso- 
morphism between a physical  sys tem and a mathematical s t ruc tu re?  I 
make one more quotat ion made almost a hundred years ago by T a i t  and 
Steele, i n  their Natural  Philosophy which for many years w a s  a 
s tandard English textbook. 
It has been long understood t h a t  approximate 
so lu t ions  of problems i n  the ordinary branches of 
Natural  Philosophy may be obtained by a species of 
abs t rac t ions  or r a the r  l imi t a t ion  of t h e  d a t a  such 
as enables us e a s i l y  to  solve the  modified form of 
t he  question while w e  a r e  w e l l  assured t h a t  the 
circumstances (so modified) a f f e c t  t h e  r e s u l t  only 
i n  a s u p e r f i c i a l  manner. 
T h i s  was apparently the point  of view of a l l  the o lde r  
physicis ts .  It w a s  the custom to construct  i n  imagination a simple 
mechanical model which was assumed to have t h e  same pointer  readings 
a s  t h e  phenomina being studied. T h i s  was called understanding the  
phenomina. Cer ta in  laws governing t h i s  model w e r e  observed and the 
model was assumed isomorphic t o  a mathematical s t r u c t u r e  and conc7-usions 
drawn. These r e s u l t s  w e r e  regarded a s  an approximation to  a fundamental 
- 10 - 
ftreali ty.lf  
Confidence i n  the  conclus3ons drawn w a s  possibly g rea t e r  than 
warranted bu t  has usua l ly  been borne ou t  by experience. 
T h i s  is st i l l  the  point  of view of many people, 
The modern tendency is  to  dispense w i t h  t he  intermediate model 
and to make a mathematical model d i r e c t l y  f r o m  the poin ter  readings. 
I am one w h o  doubts if  t h i s  is ever r e a l l y  done. T h e  a c t i o n  of 
symbols on paper u l t imate ly  goes back to a more pr imi t ive  experience. 
Modern A t o m i c  theory seems t o  be an e labora te  model construction. 
French mathematician and astronomer Painleve remarked ( I  cannot g ive  
exact re ference) t  W e  say t h a t  the Earth revolves around the Sun for  
t h e  bene f i t  of women and children - Einstein remarked (again I can 
not g ive  reference):  - Ptolemy and Copernicus were equal ly  r i g h t  o r  
equal ly  wrong. 0 Painleve evokes the mechanical model for %omen and 
chi ldrenDf1 Eins te in  apparently evokes that mechanical model t h a t  he 
needs. Students of r e l a t i v i t y  admit a model a s  "realtf  i f  it describes 
best the  phenomina being s tudied  a t  t h e  t i m e .  
no other r ea l i t y .  Thus real i ty  may change. It seems hard t o  lose 
Copernicus but  it is conceivable. Times and men change. W e  might 
construct  many models isomorphic t o  a set of pa in t e r  readings made on 
t h e  s t a r s .  
d i f f e r e n t  mathematical models even t o  t h e  invention of new mathematics. 
Is space of experience Euclidean or non-Euclidean? This question is 
without meaning o ther  than  what I have tried to  describe. For tha t  
mattem *go a s  fa r  away a s  t h e  stars to i l l u s t r a t e  a n  in t e rp re t a t ion  
of experience? 
The 
In such work there is 
Subsequent pointer  readings may be d i f f e r e n t  and l e a d  to 
The reader may remember the  fable of t h e  f o u r  b l ind  men and the  
elephant. One man f e l t  o n l y  the t a i l  another the trunk, the  th i rd  a 
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l e g  and the fou r th  only a side,  W e l l :  The b i o l o g i s t  says - But there 
r e a l l y  is an elephant to  be studied4 So answer fundamentalists the  
w o r l d  over. But w e  a r e  no t  bl ind men studying something tha t  ffexists,ff 
This word and t h e  l i t t le  word trisrc have meaning only when opera t iona l ly  
used. What a r e  these  operations? - Something t h a t  each of  t h e  t w o  
people who t a l k  to each o ther  do (can do), 
A person's experience consists of discrete sensations.  When a 
mathematician defines cont inui ty  it is t o  be noticed t h a t  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  is i n  terms of the discrete. A simple physical law l i k e  
pv = c m u s t  be construed i n  terms of t he  discrete, t h a t  is r e a l l y  i n  
t e r m s  of the  integers,  This ,  of  course, includes t h e  r a t iona l  numbers. 
Their use  amounts o n l y  to a change of u n i t  i n  a physical measurement, 
Isomorphism between a mathematical formula and a physical swtem in- 
volving t h e  i r r a t i o n a l  of the  i n f i n i t e  i n  any way is ou t s ide  t h e  
poin te r  readings and meaningless , 
I th ink  now of Study and h i s  de f in i t i on  of mathematics given 
earlier i n  t h i s  paper. What does Russell  mean by "truth" i n  h i s  two 
d e f i n i t i o n s  ? 
Where do t he  axioms of a mathematical s t r u c t u r e  come from? Does 
the  formal i s t  simply make anything that he l i kes .  If so, how? I a s k  
t h i s  question,Qea t h e  formalist dream human dreams, or t h e  dreams of 
some other creature? To the i n t u i t i o n i s t  there is nowhere for t h e  
axioms to come from but from the experience of the  man who makes them. 
What about def in i t ions?  If not operat ional ,  what? The i n t u i t i o n i s t  
admists the i n f i n i t e  for example i n f i n i t e  sequence. This  is 
the/ 
opera t iona l ly  defined, The Topologist must s c r u t i n i z e  h i s  de f in i t i ons  
w i t h  the  g rea t e s t  care. 
What of t h i s  l o g i c  which mathematicians use? Is i t  a fixed 
= 12 = 
thing? Some of us may remember t h e  e f f o r t s  made by Brouwer (17) and 
a f e w  o thers  to  exclude proof by contradiction. There w a s  a not-so- 
vocal effort, t o  exclude proof by mathematical induction. This  l a s t  
seems to m e  to have been fundamentally based on a f ee l ing  about the 
na ture  of the  pos i t i ve  integers,  A r e  they made w i t h  t h e  induction 
axiom or have they a more fundamental o r ig in?  Grant t h a t  they a r e  
manmade l i k e  the  rest of our language, but how and when was language 
made? 
Much is s a i d  about mathematics as an a r t .  Mathematics is a 
created structure not  too d i f f e r e n t  from a painting. Cer ta in ly  there 
a r e  resemblances between modern a b s t r a c t s  a r t  and modern a b s t r a c t  
mathematicsr W h a t  do they s tand for and how many people "understandff 
them? There a r e  some advantages i n  a r t .  More people c r i t i c i z e  it and 
more people pay r e a l  money for it! Mathematics has t h e  advantage that  
i n  t h e  pas t  it has helped w i t h  the bread and b u t t e r  of mankind: W e  
have hopes f o r  the fu ture .  I s h a l l  never be surpr i sed  when some w e l l -  
constructed mathematical system proves isomorphic t o  something physical. 
It has happened many times i n  t h e  past ,  Remember that t h e  axioms are 
from our experience. I am frequent ly  annoyed by thoughtless people 
speaking of mathematics a s  e te rna l ,  immutable, etc. Mathematics is 
human and l i k e  a l l  human s t ruc tu res  subjec t  to  error and change. Those 
who think that the  u l t imate  has been reached i n  any human endeavor 
a r e  very young. 
To say t h a t  the universe was made fo l lowing  a mathematical 
p a t t e r n  a s  has been done i n  "high places" seems to m e  t o  be wholly wrong 
almost s i l l y ,  
rest of h i s  language t o  describe his experience. 
Man has made h i s  mathematics j u s t  a s  he has made the  
Am I a formalist or an i n t u i t i o n i s t ?  It depends upon the t i m e  
of day. 
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